What the hell man

[Michael Degani]

“Peirce’s definition of virtuality rests, in large measure, on the notion of ‘virtus’ (originally a kind of manly virtue, closely related to words like virile, and so an easy target for critical theory), and this word can be reinterpreted in many ways. For example, if we pair this term with Aristotle’s (2001a) typology of four causes (substantive, material, effective, and telic), as potential modes of ‘virtus’, we get the prototype of virtuality: a virtual X may have the same form (appearance) or function (utility) of X, and yet be composed of a different substance (material) or made by a different artificer (origin). At one extreme, then, we might have a prosthetic arm (functioning, but not appearing, like a real arm). At another extreme ,we might have a gadget that functions like a camera but looks like a cigarette. And somewhere at the intersection of these is the poster- child of virtuality: a digitally rendered experience (linking sensory- motor interaction) that looks and feels likea ‘real’ experience, but is rendered with bits and pixels, and regimented with algo-rithms and interfaces. However, through our pairing of Aristotle and Peirce, we also get some more far- lung possibilities. For example, two entities might be composed of the same materials and created by the same artificer, yet have different forms and serve different functions (for example, the range of products produced by a silversmith). A knife would be a virtual fork. Or, less prototypic still, entities might have the same artificer (say, sieving and serendipity, or parasites and noise), but be composed of different materials, exist in different forms, and have radically different functions (for example, the world of living kinds as generated by natural selection). A spider would be a virtual fly.”